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Abstract
This paper examines a nanciers optimal monitoring intensity in a multi-
period nancing relationship. We identify conditions under which the nancier
should sometimes misidentify the quality of an entrepreneur. Such an imper-
fect evaluation technology a¤ects action choices by bad entrepreneurs. We
rst characterize the optimal monitoring intensity and show that it is one
in which the investor monitors entrepreneurs randomly. Random monitor-
ing in the rst stage of a relationship induces bad entrepreneurs to reveal
their intrinsic types. Second, because random monitoring reduces the share
of bad entrepreneurs in the subsequent periods, we show that the nancier
can therefore realize substantial gains.
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1 Introduction
Standard agency theory tells us that optimal incentive schemes make use of all avail-
able information related to the agents performance. Hart and Holmstrom (1987)
motivate the fact that "agency relationships create a demand for monitoring". Prin-
cipals have an incentive to monitor since it conveys information about the agents
behavior. Much of the literature on relationship nancing argues that screening
and monitoring can overcome information asymmetries and can provide rms with
better incentives to perform in the interest of creditors.1 Yet, whenever monitoring
is costly and/or the principal cannot observe an action that the agent is supposed to
perform, the possibility of shirking by the agent arises (hidden action).2 This gives
rise to the following question: what is the optimal nature of monitoring strategies,
and how are these related to the length of relationships?
The answer to these questions seems rather clear. When more accurate appraisals
of a rms quality are costly, the optimal allocation of resources to evaluate rms
will reect investorstrade-o¤s between the marginal cost and the marginal benet
of more accurate appraisals. In this paper, we show that a nancier may also
consider how the probability that she misidenties the quality of an entrepreneur
a¤ects entrepreneursbehavior ex ante. We are interested particularly in nding
general conditions under which random monitoring is optimal. We also aim to
analyze whether the use of probation periods in relationship nancing is benecial
to the principal. Our results should be relevant to the design of optimal verication
strategies in relationship nancing.
We develop a simple model of entrepreneurial nance and show that random
monitoring by a nancier during a probation period has two goals. The rst goal is
to identify which entrepreneurs are good and which ones are bad, so that bad rms
can be liquidated. The selection of good entrepreneurs may involve a trial period in
which nanciers monitor in order to learn more about an entrepreneurs type and
then decide whether to stop or continue the relationship. The usefulness of iden-
tifying entrepreneurs at the beginning of a relationship is particularly important
1Diamond (1984), and Fama (1985), among others, argue that banks have scale economies and
comparative cost advantages over other lenders in producing information about the borrowers.
Others, such as Chemmanur and Fulghieri (1994) attribute the monitoring ability of banks to their
incentives to build their reputation as lenders. The literature on banks incentives to monitor
includes Winton (1993), Holmstrom and Tirole (1997) and Carletti (2004). See Boot (2000) for a
more specic review of relationship banking.
2Costly state verication environment model was originally developed by Townsend (1979) and
was subsequently extended by Diamond (1984), Gale and Hellwig (1985).
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if one recognizes that information about the rmsquality is asymmetric between
entrepreneurs and creditors. In our setting, entrepreneurs may take hidden actions
that a¤ect expected period project revenues. In particular, some investments can
be protable hence, lowering the probability that the rm defaults on its loan oblig-
ations or suboptimal hence, increasing the likelihood of bankruptcy.3 Financiers are
thus interested in discriminating between "intrinsically good" entrepreneurs, there-
fore make e¢ cient investment decisions and rm value-maximizing decisions in all
cases and opportunistic entrepreneurs who instead would persist with suboptimal
projects if the probability of detection is su¢ ciently low and the cost of making
value-increasing decisions is high. The second goal is to allow the nancier to lter
out bad entrepreneurs at a time when separation has low cost. Long-term relation-
ships may become gradually costly over time if the contract tends to get richer as
new information arises and to incorporate a growing number of contingent clauses
over time -clauses specifying circumstances under which a party can make changes
to the project or terminate it-.
We characterize the optimal monitoring intensity and show that it is one in
which the investor investigates randomly. The general formulation is a dynamic
principal agent costly state verication environment in which the agents type is
unknown and the principal and agents interests are not aligned over action choice.
In our relationship nancing setting, the nancier must choose the intensity of an
evaluation technology to verify the entrepreneurs type, and the outcome of the
evaluation a¤ects whether the entrepreneur is retained after the probation period.
We show that the investor optimally chooses a relatively small monitoring intensity
in order to induce some of the bad entrepreneurs to reveal their intrinsic types.
We could have presented our analysis in the context of shareholders in a rm
who must choose an evaluation technology to decide whether to replace management.
Shareholders may want bad managers to take actions that signal that they should be
replaced.4 Shareholders may optimally choose an imperfect evaluation technology as
the possibility of misidentifying bad managers may provide the right incentives for
management. So too, the analysis could have been posed in a venture capital/equity
nance context. In that case, continued projects require additional capital, and the
nancier decides whether to renance based on a noisy signal received about the
entrepreneurs type.
3Fudenberg and Tirole (1995) show that managersconcerns about job security motivate them
to prefer a smooth prole of earnings streams over time.
4The signal might be lower immediate revenues indicating that the manager is bad.
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Our paper relates to the literature on optimal monitoring initiated by Diamond
(1984). By fullling the task of monitoring a rms investment and type, a creditor
can resolve the ambiguity of what has caused bad short-run results, and there-
fore allows implementing the e¢ cient continuation decision. Potentially, this should
eliminate the rms moral hazard problem with respect to investment choice. In
our setting the "hidden action" brings about the incentives problems and then we
consider how random monitoring impacts corporate investment and nancing de-
cisions.5 This approach allows us to characterize how the probability of detection
ultimately a¤ects the ex ante behavior of managers.
The literature on strategic ignorance recasts the problem of screening an agent
under asymmetric information (Carillo and Mariotti, 2000; Benabou and Tirole
2002). For example, Cremer (1995) and Dewatripont and Maskin (1995) argue that
in a principal-agent problems, a credible commitment of a principal not to acquire
information ex ante about the agent may strengthen incentives and overwhelm the
gains from better information.6 Cowen and Glazer (1996) and Dubey andWu (2001)
show that a principal might benet from having a less accurate picture of agents.
One can interpret our paper as contributing to the literature on optimal monitoring
by modeling the ex ante decisions of parties within a nancing relationship envi-
ronment. We explicitly model the features that characterize long-term nancing
relationships. First, the longer is the relationship the higher is the cost of terminat-
ing the contract. In our paper, the investor who nances the project at an early stage
of the relationship acquires a good understanding of the environment through moni-
toring and can extract high future cash ows by threatening to liquidate the project.
But once the probation has come to an end, because the nancier cannot credibly
threaten to liquidate the project, she can extract only a fraction of the cash ows
generated. Second, because monitoring randomly restricts the nanciers choice of
incentive contracts, the optimal response can be to introduce a probation system.7
The literature on nancing relationships typically models nancing contracts as a
sequence of short term contracts.8 Since short-run results are informative about
the rms quality, long term contracts will optimally use this signal. Hence, one
5This "hidden action" framework for studing the economic implication of relationships nancing
has been also studied by Aghion and Bolton (1997).
6Kaplow and Shavell (1994) also stress the importance of commitment when the problem of
time inconsistency is prevalent.
7See Eeckhoudt et al. (1988) for an application to Insurance. Optimal probation in Personal
Economics Literature includes Bull and Tedeshi (1989), Sadanand et al. (1989).
8Townsend (1982), Fudenberg, Holmstrom, and Milgrom (1990) and Rey and Salanie (1990)
model sequences of short-term contracts in long-term relationships under asymmetric informa-
tion. With short term nancing, funds are only committed for one period, and the rm obtains
continuation nance if and only if it has produced good short term results.
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can argue that implicit probationary periods are widely used in standard nancial
theory. The closest paper to ours is Ichino and Muehlheusser (2004) who analyze
the possibility to use random tests in an employer-employee relationship to screen
workers during probation. Apart from the distinct framework our contribution is
threefold. First, we do not use the extreme monitoring strategies - probability zero
or one- to characterize optimal monitoring, instead the optimal monitoring intensity
arises as an equilibrium phenomenon. Second, since optimal monitoring relates to
the share of bad entrepreneurs remaining in the subsequent period we endogenize
the monitoring intensity when analyzing the nanciers gain in prots. Finally, we
emphasize a dynamic interaction observed in investment relationships: long-term -
nancing is provided conditional on revelation-inducing action choices in early stages
of the relationship. In other words, in our paper, the optimal monitoring intensity
during probation serves both as a screening and discipline device that is benecial
to the nancier in subsequent stages.
Our paper is also related to the hold-up literature begun by Williamson (1985).9
In the standard model, a court costlessly enforces only the aspects of the contract
that it can verify. Benrhardt and Nosal (2004) present a model where the court
makes errors and the parties prefer to renegotiate the original contract to eliminate
ex post ine¢ ciencies. This result mirrors ours as in our model less monitoring
during a probation period promotes optimal ex ante behavior. However, in our
paper, ltering out bad types of entrepreneurs through monitoring during probation
is possible (or has low cost) precisely in the sense that there is no need to verify
misbehavior in court in order to end the relationship.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the eco-
nomic model. Section 3 analyzes the equilibrium behaviors of agents. Section 4
presents the gains from monitoring at random for the investor. Section 5 concludes.
2 Model
2.1 Overview
We consider a nancing relationship that is assumed to last at most two periods.
At date 0, a single risk-neutral entrepreneur requires external funding of one unit
9For a survey of the literature on incomplete contracts and the hold-up problem see Schmitz
(2001).
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of capital to nance an ex ante positive NPV project. The potentially two-period-
lived project is nanced by a risk-neutral investor. At date 1, the entrepreneur
chooses whether or not to invest in a good project. The entrepreneurs type and
investment choice a¤ect expected period project revenues. The investor does not
know whether the rm should be liquidated or the entrepreneur should retain control
and continue operate the rm in the second period. Thus, each manager is monitored
with probability : At date 2, given the outcome of the monitoring procedure, the
investor may immediately liquidate the rm or allow it to continue its operations.
At date 2, if there is no liquidation, nal payo¤s are realized and period 1 ends. In
period 2, all remaining entrepreneurs may receive another investment opportunity.
All participants are risk neutral.
2.1.1 Timing of events
Period 1:
 Date 0: The investor chooses a monitoring intensity  for the rst
period.
 Date 1: Entrepreneurs investment choice ai 2 fG;Bg is made; moni-
toring occurs with probability :
 Date 2: Monitoring outcome M 2 fG;B; 0g is realized; Continuation
or liquidation decision L 2 f0; 1g takes place.
 Date 3: Final payo¤s are realized.
Period 2:
 Entrepreneurs again make an investment choice.
2.2 Detailed Assumptions
2.2.1 Entrepreneurs
We consider N  1 entrepreneurs, each has access to a project and seeks potential
investors. Each risk-neutral entrepreneur requires one unit of capital to nance the
ex ante positive NPV project. To keep the analysis simple, we assume that the
relationship lasts at most two periods, i = 1; 2. The rst period is a probation
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period in which the investor estimates the entrepreneurs eligibility for a long-term
relationship nancing.10 The second period is the time after probation.
Entrepreneurs types are represented by a parameter  2 fh; lg, where "high
types" are denoted by h and "low types" by l:11 In the population of entrepreneurs,
the proportion of high and low types is respectively  and (1 ). This information
is common knowledge to all actors in the economy.12 Each entrepreneur chooses an
action from ai 2 fG;Bg that corresponds to investing in a good or in a bad project
in each period. The investment choice determines in turn the probability that a
rm defaults. Hence, choosing a good project corresponds to taking the low-default
action while choosing a bad project corresponds to taking the high default action.13
The timing of events is such that the entrepreneur learns the project type prior to
take any action.
Both the entrepreneurs type,  and his action choice, ai may a¤ect the expected
period project revenues, yi: We assume that the revenue from a project terminated
after the rst period is 0:14 In the subsequent period we assume that the nancier
receives a high output y2 > 0 from a good entrepreneur whereas a bad entrepreneur
generates only y2, where  < 1:  refers to an e¢ ciency parameter that reects the
usefulness of identifying bad entrepreneurs as early as possible. What we have in
mind is that during the rst period the nancier monitors as well as builds a rela-
tionship with entrepreneurs. Monitoring during the initial phase of the relationship
allows the investor to learn more about the entrepreneurs type and project. Yet,
once the probation period has come to an end, the investor and the entrepreneur are
engaged in a long term relationship in the sense that bad entrepreneurs who were
not ltered out through monitoring may engage in opportunistic actions at no risk.
We use  to capture the di¤erence from facing a high type of entrepreneur instead
of a low type. Hence,  = y2   y2 is the di¤erence in expected period 2 outputs
from dealing with a high type of entrepreneur rather than with a low type.
In addition, entrepreneurs are heterogeneous with respect to the costs of taking
10This assumption describes a situation in which the investor learns about the rm over time
("relationship nancing").
11Our approach corresponds to a model where costs and types take a continuum of values if the
distributions degenerate to a single atom (see Feldman and Winer, 2004).
12This assumption is maintained for simplicity, but could be relaxed to allow for a richer set of
predictions from the model.
13Note that with a slight modication of the model, the high default action could correspond to
shirking, while the low default action could correspond to work hard.
14Note that we could alternatively assume that the output from the low-default action in period
1 is y1 > 0. This would not change qualitatively our results as long as we reect the fact that the
output in period 1 is negligible compared to period 2.
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the low default action in each period. In particular, good entrepreneurs do not face
any cost of taking the low default action. In contrast, a bad type of entrepreneur
can take the costly low default action to pass himself as good and therefore avoid
being liquidated at the end of the probation period. Let ci, be the costs for bad
entrepreneurs associated with taking the low default action in period i, where c1 = c
and c2 = k:c with k > 0, and c is drawn from a distribution function H(c) 2 C2
with support [0; 1]. The parameter k allows for discounting costs with respect to
the length of period 2 relative to period 1.
The nancing contract species the payment to the investor and entrepreneurial
payo¤s in each period.15 The expected period payment to the creditor is just the
di¤erence between expected period project revenues and expected entrepreneurial
payo¤s: yi  i. Let 1 be the entrepreneurs payo¤ when the project is terminated
after the rst period and 2 is the benet from a second period project. We assume
that 2 > 1: This inequality illustrates the fact that the entrepreneur benets more
the longer the relationship is continued.16 We assume furthermore that the benet
from being retained in the subsequent period outweigh the cost of e¤ort in period
1 for a low-type entrepreneur. Alternatively, the revenue for the investor from each
entrepreneur who takes a good project in period 2 is positive. Thus, it must be the
case that y2 > 2  1.17
2.2.2 The Investor
This subsection discusses a particular feature of the model: the investor can monitor
the entrepreneur during the rst stage of the relationship and the outcome of the
monitoring a¤ects the investors decision to terminate or continue the relationship
with the entrepreneur in the subsequent period. This is formalized as follows.
During period 1, the investor chooses the intensity of its monitoring activities,
denoted by  2 [0; 1]:18 We interpret the variable,  to be the probability that
15To be consistent with a variety of economic environments, we impose little structure on the
nancing contract between the entrepreneur and the investor. In equilibrium, the investor must
expect to get back at least his one unit of capital investment from the rm.
16In period 2, the entrepreneur is retained for a long-term relationship. In a more elaborate model
we can imagine that the entrepreneurs reputation is enhanced if the project is not liquidated after
the rst period.
17In other words, the entrepreneurial payo¤s in period 2 are strictly greater than the maximum
cost of choosing the low default action.
18We assume that the bank can commit to a monitoring intensity so that the fact that the
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the investor learns which action the entrepreneur chose. With probability (1   ),
the investor will get no further information about the managers investment choice.
The outcome of the monitoring activity is dened as M 2 fG;B; 0g; where M = G
perfectly reveals that the project is good, M = B perfectly reveals that it is bad,
and M = 0 denotes the case where the entrepreneur was not monitored. It is
assumed that monitoring has no cost for the investor. After observing the outcome
of the monitoring activity and updating its beliefs about the entrepreneurstypes
using Bayes rule, the investor makes a liquidation decision L 2 f0; 1g: The investor
chooses to immediately liquidate the rm for a value normalized to zero, L = 1 or
allows the entrepreneur to continue operate the rm in the second period, L = 0.
It is also assumed that the population of entrepreneurs is su¢ ciently large such
that, monitoring one entrepreneur gives no further inference about the pool of the
remaining N   1 entrepreneurs.
We want the investor to continue rather than liquidate the project in period 2
whenever its beliefs after the monitoring process are greater or equal to the prior,
 of dealing with a good entrepreneur. Hence, the following inequality must hold:
(y2   2) + (1   )(y2   2) > 0: The rst term corresponds to the investors
expected payo¤when facing a good entrepreneur and the second term is the expected
payo¤ from dealing with a bad entrepreneur who generates only y2.
Let us consider the investors optimal liquidation versus continuation decision at
time 2 after monitoring has been carried out. We rst denote by  2 [0; 1] the belief
of dealing with a good entrepreneur conditional on the outcome of the monitoring
activity. Hence the investors posterior belief is given by (using Bayes rule):
 := Pr( = hjM) = 
+ (1  )g() (1)
where g() denotes the probability of investing in a good project.19
In period 2, entrepreneurial payo¤s 2 are paid independently of performances.
Throughout we assume that both types choose the low default action when indif-
investor monitors is veriable. To be credible the announced monitoring intensity must be incentive
compatible: the nancier must not have an ex post incentive to compromise commitment. For
example, nanciersreputational concerns give them incentives to monitor (See Chemmanur and
Fulghieri (1994) for theoretical arguments and Fang (2005) among others for empirical studies).
Another possibility is to consider limited monitoring capacities (See e.g. Holmstrom and Tirole,
1997; Chiesa, 2001).
19The exact denition of this probability is given in Equation (5) below.
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ferent so that good entrepreneurs will always invest in the good project, ah2 = G:
20
In opposition, bad entrepreneurspayo¤s are (2   k:c) when they invest in a good
project, while taking the high default action yields 2. Consequently, bad entrepre-
neurs will always invest in a bad project, al2 = B 8c > 0. As a result, the investors
expected utility from an entrepreneur in this period as a function of  is given by:
(y2   2) + (1  )(y2   2) (2)
Consequently, the investor will liquidate the rm whenever the outcome of the
monitoring activity provides a belief su¢ ciently low about the entrepreneur being a
good type, i.e. when:
L() =

1 if  < 2 y2

0 otherwise
(3)
where  = y2  y2 is the di¤erence in terms of period 2 output for the investor
when facing a high type of entrepreneur rather than a low type.
3 Equilibrium Analysis
3.1 EntrepreneursInvestment Choices
The literature contains a large number of renements of the Nash equilibrium con-
cept. An equilibrium notion that captures the intuitions being modeled is the se-
quential equilibrium concept developed by Kreps and Wilson (1982). The sequential
equilibrium in our environment is as follows. An entrepreneur has a choice of under-
taking a good (or equivalently a low default action) or bad project (or equivalently
a high default action) at date 1. At date 2, the investor has a choice of liquidating
the rm or allowing the manager to retain control and continue operate the rm in
the next period. The sequential equilibrium requires that the investor forms beliefs
about the entrepreneurs type, both in the case where the entrepreneur takes the low
default action and where the entrepreneur takes the high default action. Along the
equilibrium path, these beliefs are formed using Bayes rule. Given the investors
beliefs and hence actions, the manager must not be able to gain from deviating.
Lemma 1 At date 1, for all  <  = 1
2
; there exists a unique equilibrium continu-
ation in which,
20All we need is that the expected payo¤ for the investor in period 2 from facing a good entre-
preneur is positive.
9
(i) good entrepreneurs take the low default action, while bad managers take the
high default action whenever the costs of investment are su¢ ciently high (i.e. when
Pr(c > 2) > 0):
21
(ii) The investor updates her beliefs about the entrepreneurs type and optimally
liquidates the rms for which the outcome of the monitoring activity reveals that the
entrepreneurs chose the high default action and keeps all others, including the rms
that have not been monitored.
Consider rst a good entrepreneur. On the equilibrium path, by taking the low
default action the good entrepreneurs payo¤ is 1 in period 1, and 2 in period 2.
If the investor monitors the entrepreneur, the outcome of the monitoring activity
reveals that the project is good, i.e. M = G. Hence, the investor holds the beliefs
 > . Given these beliefs, the investor optimally decides that the entrepreneur
should retain control and continue to operate the rm in the second period.22 Now,
if a good entrepreneur chooses the high default action, payo¤s are still 1 in the
rst period. Yet, if the entrepreneur is monitored during the probation period, with
probability  the investor concludes that the project is bad, and the investor holds
the belief  = Pr( = hjM = B) = 0. Hence, the outcome of the monitoring
perfectly reveals that the project is bad and the investor optimally liquidates the
project. It follows that second period expected entrepreneurial payo¤s are equal
to (1   )2: As a result, a good entrepreneur will always invest in a good project
during the probation period, ah1 = G:
Let us now consider a bad entrepreneur. On the equilibrium path, when an
entrepreneur takes the low default action, entrepreneurial payo¤s are 1 c in period
1, where c denotes the costs associated with taking the low default action incurred
by bad entrepreneurs. If there is some monitoring, the entrepreneur who invests in
a good project is taken to be a good type such that the project is not liquidated.
In consequence, entrepreneurial payo¤s in period 2 are 2, since in that period, bad
entrepreneurs will then invest in a bad project in order to save on costs associated
with taking the low default action. Now, when a bad entrepreneur invests in a bad
project, the rst period entrepreneurial payo¤s are still 1: Recall that by taking the
high default action, the entrepreneur does not incur any cost of investing. Yet, if
there is some monitoring, with probability  he is found to be taking the high default
action. In that case, the investor holds the belief  = Pr( = hjM = B) = 0. Given
21The exact denition of this probability is given in Equation (6) below.
22In opposition, if there is no monitoring, the investor holds the belief  =  and the project is
not liquidated either. Or, we can alternatively assume that an agents investment project cannot
be liquidated without being monitored.
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this belief, the investors optimal decision is to liquidate the project. Consequently,
in period 2, the entrepreneurs expected payo¤ from taking the high default action
is equal to (1  )2: Thus, the optimal decision of a bad entrepreneur is given by:
al

1 (; c) =

B if c > 2
G if c  2 (4)
Hence, bad entrepreneurs take the high default action whenever the investment
costs are su¢ ciently high. The conditions for which there exists an equilibrium
continuation are tied to a threshold,  = 1
2
that relates the benet from a long-
term nancing in period 2 to the maximum cost of investing for a bad entrepreneur
in period 1 which is equal to 1. Clearly, when the benet from investing in good
project is high bad entrepreneurs have strong incentives to pass themselves as good
in order to avoid being liquidated. This means that there would be no information
transmission in equilibrium and this prevents the nancier from learning about en-
trepreneurstypes. Then, we will show that it is indeed optimal for the investor to
choose some monitoring intensity below the threshold,  <  so that both possible
actions, B and G occur with positive probability on the equilibrium path thereby
allowing information revelation and screening between types.
3.2 Investors optimal monitoring intensity
We now derive the investors optimal choice of the monitoring intensity  at time 1.
The investors objective is to maximize its expected payo¤.
Consider a good entrepreneur. In period 1, there are N good entrepreneurs.
At this period, none of them invest in a bad project and in consequence, there is
no liquidation. In period 2, again none of them take the high default action and
the investor gets (y2   2) > 0 from dealing with a good entrepreneur. Note that
when the investor faces good types of entrepreneurs, the payo¤s are independent of
the monitoring probability, , which in turn neither inuences the number of good
entrepreneurs in each period nor the entrepreneursinvestment choice.
Consider a bad entrepreneur. In period 1, a bad entrepreneur will invest in a
bad project whenever the costs of investing are su¢ ciently high, i.e. when c > 2:
Hence, from the investors point of view, the probabilities of choosing the low default
action and the high default action are given by, respectively:
g() := Pr(c  2) = H(2) 2 [0; 1] (5)
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b() := Pr(c > 2) = 1 H(2) 2 [0; 1] (6)
Clearly we have dg
d
 0 and db
d
 0 and b0() =  g0():
Since there are (1   )N low-ability entrepreneurs, the expected payo¤ for the
investor in period 1 is given by:
V1 = (1  )N [b() + g()]( 1)
V1 = (1  )N( 1) (7)
From the investors point of view, monitoring during the probation period is
important to the extent that it inuences the number of bad types remaining in
the second period. Consequently, the monitoring intensity  should be set in a
way that induces some entrepreneurs to take the high default action in period 1
in order to allow for the detection of bad types. Formally, the number of bad
entrepreneurs remaining in period 2 is composed of entrepreneurs who invested in a
good project and continue to operate the rm in the second period and entrepreneurs
who chose the high default action but who were not identied through monitoring:
(1  )N [g() + (1  )b()]:
Given this number, the expected payo¤ generated by bad entrepreneurs for the
investor in period 2 is given by:
V2 = (1  )N [g() + (1  )b()](y2   2) (8)
Now, rewriting equation (8) as:
V2() = (1  )NZ()
where Z() is dened as,
Z() = (1  + g())(y2   2)
so that the optimal monitoring intensity,  is uniquely determined by Z():
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Proposition 2 If the function Z() is C1 and convex, such that (H(0) 1)(H(1) 
1 +H 0(1) < 0), then there exists an optimal monitoring intensity,  2]0; 1
2
[ which
induces choosing the high default action on the equilibrium path.
Proof. See the Appendix.
Note rst that  <  implies that the equilibrium behaviors determined by
Lemma 1 are optimal and so Lemma 1 together with Proposition 2 characterize
indeed the unique equilibrium. The above proposition states that the monitoring
intensity  is optimal when an interior solution is chosen: 0 <  <  = 1
2
< 1:
Choosing a relatively small monitoring intensity allows the nancier to identify
an entrepreneurs inclination for ine¢ cient action. This mechanism is completely
independent of the costs of monitoring for the investor. Instead, it relies on the
benet for the entrepreneur from future interaction with the investor in comparison
to the cost of investing in a good project at the beginning of the relationship.
4 Substantial gains from random monitoring
We now consider the percentage gain in prots for the investor from choosing a
monitoring intensity with probability : Recall that the benets of monitoring
optimally relate to the share of bad entrepreneurs remaining in period 2 such that
the investor is able to lter out bad types and liquidate the projects that should be
liquidated.
The project is liquidated only if the entrepreneur invests in a bad project in
period 1 and is detected through monitoring. From proposition 2, the optimal
monitoring intensity,  is an interior solution. Then, the probability that a bad
entrepreneur remains in period 2 is strictly less than 1 reecting the fact that the
investor is able to lter out some of the bad entrepreneurs. In that case, the investors
gain from choosing an "interior" monitoring intensity,  is given by:
V = (1  )N [b()](y2   2) > 0 (9)
Relative to the payo¤ given by equation (9), the percentage increase in prots
can thus be calculated as:
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V% =
V
V2(
1
2
)
= b() (10)
We can further illustrate this result by calculating the optimal monitoring in-
tensity. To do this, consider the particular case where H(2) = ee 1(1  e 2): To
simplify the algebra we pose: e
e 1 = 0 such that H(2) = (1   e 2)0: Using
equation (5), we get b() = 1 H(2): We thus have the following results:
It has been shown that equation (8) can be rewritten as, V2 = (1  )N [1  +
g()](y2   2) where
Z() = 1  + 0   0e 2
= 1 + (0   1)  0e 2
Taking the derivative with respect to  yields
Z 0() = 0   1  0e 2 + 20e 2
= 0   1 + (20   0)e 2
Taking the second derivative with respect to  yields
Z 00() = (202   022)e 2
which is clearly a convex function. Thus, there exists a such that:
Z 0() = 0
() 0(1  2)e 2 = e 1
thus,  is a global minimum of Z():
The following table illustrates our results:
 1 0:5 0:16 0:067
 0:5 0:3 0:09 0:04
g() = H(2) 0:62 0:69 0:7 0:71
V% = b() 19% 9:3% 2:7% 1:16%
As  decreases reecting that the benet from continuation in period 2 is high
for a bad entrepreneur, monitoring during probation is not a very e¤ective device
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to lter out bad types. On the other hand, when  is high reecting that the
investment costs are high compared to the benet from continuation, the investor
can use monitoring as a selection device and realizes substantial gains. However,
it is never optimal to set the monitoring probability  above the threshold : In
consequence, as specied by proposition 2, the monitoring probability is optimal
when it is set to, 0 <  <  = 1
2
< 1:
In summary, using probation periods seems to be more rewarding to the investor
as entrepreneurs take the high default action during this period. This happens when
costs associated with taking the low default action are large with high probability
and when the entrepreneurs benet from the second period is not too high.
5 Conclusion
The theory presented in this paper models a dynamic principal-agent costly state
verication environment in which the creditor (principal) can monitor entrepreneurs
(agents) during the rst stage of a nancing relationship. Monitoring is motivated
by the need to evaluate the agents intrinsic type and learn about his behavior when
he is no longer monitored. We show that there is an incentive for the investor
to choose a relatively small monitoring intensity in order to induce some of the
bad entrepreneurs to take the high default action in the probation period. This
mechanism relies on the share of bad entrepreneurs remaining after the probation
period. Hence, the result holds even if monitoring is costless.23 Furthermore, we
show that the use of probation periods, together with some monitoring during the
beginning of a nancing relationship, is benecial to the principal when agents
perceive a benet from future interaction which is not too large in comparison to
the cost of choosing the low default action during probation.
The paper imposes little structure on the nancing contract. The principal
monitors agents randomly during the probation period and this restricts her choice
of incentive contract. Yet, random monitoring during the initial phase of a long-
term relationship may screen out opportunistic entrepreneurs and thus is benecial
for the creditor if terminating the relationship becomes more costly over time. Our
qualitative results clearly extend to more general nancing contracts. For example,
23Assuming that monitoring is costly would make the optimal intensity even lower. Besanko and
Spulber (1989) show that optimal investigation probabilities are less than one by appealing to the
existence of convex enforcement costs functions.
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qualitatively, a bank enjoying an informational advantage at the subsequent stage
of a relationship can extract rents and if this is anticipated by the rm, this may
have negative consequences for ex ante e¢ ciency. Overall, the contracting problem
under monitoring should be set in a way that gives the rm the right incentives for
e¤ort taking and project choice but also gives the bank the incentives to take the
e¢ cient continuation/liquidation decision. It is still the case that it is optimal to
introduce some randomness in the evaluation technology if the main objective for the
principal is to screen agents. This paper does not recommend that creditors should
use dice to select entrepreneurs, but our analysis suggests that reducing uncertainty
in evaluation technologies may not improve screening, and in fact, can have the
opposite e¤ect.
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6 Appendix
Proof of Proposition 2:
We want to show that there exists an optimal monitoring intensity, 0 <  <
 = 1
2
< 1: Recall that  is uniquely determined by a function Z() dened as :
Z() = (1  + g())(y2   2)
Since Z() is C1 then Z 0() is continuous in [0; 1
2
]: Then,
Z 0() = ( 1 + g() + g0())(y2   2)
Recall that from the investors point of view, the probability of choosing the low
default action is given by:
g() := H(2)
Then, we get :
Z 0(0) = (g(0)  1)(y2   2) = (H(0)  1)(y2   2)
Z 0(
1
2
) = (g(
1
2
)  1 + 1
2
g0(
1
2
))(y2   2)
= (H(1)  1 +H 0(1))(y2   2)
Since Z 0(0)  Z 0( 1
2
) < 0, therefore, as follows from the intermediate value the-
orem, there exists a  2]0; 1
2
[ such that Z 0(0) = 0: Thus,  is a critical point,
therefore  is a global minimum of Z():
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